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ACTION ON THE CASE.
See SALE OF GOODS, II. 2.
ADMIIRALTY.
I. Pleading on Libelfor Information.
See STEAMBOAT, 3.
II. Jurisdiction.
See STEASXBOAT, 4.
AGENCY.
I. Undisclosed Principal.
Agent for foreign principal, selling goods by Sample, without disclosing
his agency, liable in case on the implied warranty. Allen vs. Scluchardt, 13
IL Fraudulent Aypropriation of Proceeds of Sale by Agent.
See FRAUD.
ANTECEDENT DEBT.
Were a good Consideration.
See BILLS AND NOTES, IL
FRAUD.
ARREST.
I. How made on Civil Process-Escape.
1. An officer is not bound to call for aid in the service of mesne process,
and is not liable for an escape that might have been prevented by his
calling for aid. Whithead vs. Keyes, . . . . . 471
2. An officer is bound to use all reasonable and proper personal exer-
tions to secure a person for whose arrest he has a writ; and if, in the
opinion of the jury, he has not done so, he may be held liable for an
escape, although he used all such exertions as he deemed necessary at the
time. Id.
3. An officer effects an arrest by laying his hand upon a person whom
he has authority to arrest, for the purpose of airesting him although he
may not succeed in stopping or holding him. Id.
VoL. 10.-49 (769)
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II. Actual Possession of Warrant, necessary.
1. A warrant was issued by a justice of the county of C., directed to
the constable of the township of N., and generally to all her Majesty's
officers of the peace in and for the said county, commanding them, or
some of them, forthwith to apprehend W. G., and convey him before two
justices of C. to answer for not obeying a bastardy order for payment of
money. The warrant was delivered to the superintendent of police, and
had subsequently been in the possession of D., one of the police consta-
bles. Afterwards D. and S., police constables, while on duty in uniform,
arrested W. G. under the warrant, but they had it not in their possession
at the time of the arrest, it. being at the station house. W. G. was rescued
by several persons, who assaulted the constables D. and S. Whereupon
informations for the rescue and assault were laid against the parties by
the constables; and at the hearing before justices the complaint as to the
rescue was withdrawn, and that for the assault proceeded with, and the
parties were convicted:
Held, that the conviction was bad, as the arrest by the constables was
illegal, they not having the warrant in their possession at the time. Gal-
liard vs. Laxton, . . . . . . . . 305
Held, also, that the withdrawal of the information as to the rescue was
no bar to proceeding with the complaint as to the assault. Id.
ATTORNEY.
Lien for Costs.
1. A collusive settlement of an action, by te parties, to deprive an
attorney of his costs, made after a notice from the attorney, of his claim,
to the defendant, will not be allowed to prejudice the attorney's right to
enforce payment of his taxable costs. Carpenter vs. The S ith Avenue
Railroad Company, .. . . . . 410
2. His claim for taxable costs will be protected against a collusive set-
tlement in an action upon a tort merely personal, as well as in an action
upon contract; and as well against a settlement made before trial as after
judgment. Id.
3. But an attorney, by an agreement between him and his client, that,
besides taxable costs, he shall receive as a compensation for his services
a sum equal to one-third of the sum recovered, will not acquire any right
in the subject-matter of such an action, or control over it, which will affect
the power of the plaintiff to settle and release the claim for damages before
a trial has been had. Id.
4. The reported cases in regard to an attorney's lien, or right to be
compensated for his costs, classified and considered. Id.
BANKS AND BANKERS.
I. Charter requiring payment in Gold or Silver Coin.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IL 2.
IL Bills remitted to Banker for Collection.
See BiLLs AND NoTxs, L
BASTARD.
See CONSTTUTIONAL LAW.
BILLS AND NOTES.
I. .Remitted for collection, and credite I as cash, when held for value.
M., C. & M., of Baltimore, indorsed in blank and deposited for col-
lection with J. L. & Co., bankers and collecting agents in the same city,
a bill payable in New York. The latter indorsed for colliction to the
plaintiffs, also bankers and collection agents doing business in New York.
Each of these two houses was constantly remitting paper to the other
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for collection, and knew that each remitted paper for collection' belong-
ing to third persons. The remitted paper, when payable at sight, was
collected, and then credited as cash. That payable in future was enter-
ed in the books of the house receiving it, as received for collection,
and was not otherwise credited, unless, nor until it was actually paid.
According to the course of business, each house drew for the cash bal-
ance in its favor, arising from actual collections, and not against paper
remitted and not matured. There was no express agreement between
them, that either should hold the paper it held running to maturity, as
security for the paper remitted to the other for collection, or for cash bal-
ances. J. L. & Co., at the time of remitting the bill in question to the
plaintiffs, owed them a small cash balance, and immediately thereafter
received from the plaintiffs other remittances, which they collected,
but failed to pay over, and failed in business before the bill iR ques-
tion matured. The plaintiffs were immediately notified that the bill be-
longed to I., C. & A., but on demand thereof refused to surrender it.
Hed, That the plaintiffs could not retain the bill as against if., C. 4-
.L, as indemnity against the balance owing to them by J7. L. 4- Co., and
that they were not bond fide holders for value in such sense as to have
acquired a title superior to that of hI., C. & I. Hoffman vs. Miller, 676
2. Hld, also, That evidence by the plaintiffs, that in making the remit-
tances, made after receiving the bill in question, they looked to, and re-
lied on, the unmatured paper in their hands, received from J. L. & Co.,
was not entitled to any consideration, as neither any agreement nor the
course of dealing between them and J. L. & Co., authorized them to so
rely, and J. L. & Co. had no reason to suspect that any remittance made
to them was influenced by any such consideration. Id.
II. Fraudulently negotiated--Bond fide Holder-Antecedent Debt, when good Con-
sideration.
Where L. executed and delivered to H. four blank promissory notes,
and authorized him to fill the blanks with sums not exceeding $5000 each,
for the purpose of negotiating them for the benefit of L.; and H. deli-
vered to L. similar notes, to serve as receipts, or to indemnify him in
case he (i.) should misuse any of the funds arising from the negotiation
of L.'s notes; and H. returned the notes executed by L. to him with the
blanks unfilled; and one of the notes executed by H. was filled by L.
with the sum of $8629.81, and passed to the plaintiffs by indorsement as
collateral security for an antecedent debt, it was held, that the court did
not err in instructing the jury:
1. That the onus of showing the consideration of the note was upon the
maker, the presumption being that it was sufficient.
2. That if the indorsees were bona fide holders for a good considera-
tion, it could make no difference that it was executed in blank, or that it
was accommodation paper which had been misused by the indorser.
8. That if the transaction was an exchange of notes, the indorsee
could not be defeated by showing that, subsequent to the transfer, H.
had delivered up and cancelled the notes of the indorser.
4. That if H.'s notes were delivered merely to stand as receipts to
protect L. in case H. should misuse the funds arising from the notes given
to him to negotiate, any note filled up by L. (his notes having been re-
turned to him) would in his hands be without consideration.
5. That the presumption was that the indorsee took the note in good
faith, in the usual course of business, before its maturity, and for a val-
uable consideration; that express or actual notice that the note was
without consideration, or that it had been filled up without authority,
was not necessary; that it is sufficient if the circumstances brought home
to the plaintiffs are of such a strong and pointed character as neces-
sarily to cast a shade upon the transaction and put them upon inquiry;
that the indorsees are not charged with notice because of any want of
diligence on their part in making inquiry, or if they took the note under
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suspicious circumstances, provided they had no notice actual or construe-
tive of the equities between the original parties; that the defendant
was not bound to prove that the plaintiff purchased with full and certain
knowledge of the want of consideration, but if the circumstances attend-
ing the transfer of the note were such as to put them on their guard, or
if they must have known therefrom that the person offering it had no
right to transfer it, then they were bound to make inquiry, and if they
did not, they took the note at their peril.
6. That though the plaintiffs took the note as collateral security for an
antecedent debt, they are nevertheless primll facie, though not conclu-
sively, to be coxsidered as holders for value, and it is on the defendant
to show that they are not such holders; that if it was taken for collate-
ral security only, the plaintiffs parting with nothing, giving no time,
relinquishing no right, nor suffering damages or injury as the consider-
.ation or in consequence of receiving it, they would not be such holders.
Trustees of.Iowa College vs. Hill, . 745
IIL Where Demand to be made, on change of Residence of Alaker.
1. A. made his promissory note in the city of New York, payable
generally. He resided at the time in New York, as well as the indorser.
Before the note fell due, he removed to New Jersey, where he resided at
its maturity. Held, that it was not necessary for the holder, in order to
charge the indorser, to present the note for payment at the maker's
former place of residence in New York. Foster vs. rJulien, . 363
2. The cases of Anderson vs. Drake, 14 Johnson 114, and Taylor vs.
Snyder, 3 Denio 145,'commented upon, and the case of Wheeler vs. Field,
6 Metcalf, 290 overruled. Id.
BILL OF PARCELS.
See SALE OF GonDs, I.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS.
Jurisdiction of Equity to enforce.
See INJUNCTION.
COAL.
Dug by mistake of Boundaries.
See TRovra.
CONDITION.
I. When enforced as agreement in Equity.
See INJUNCTION.
IL Release of.
See Ii-umz cioN.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
I. Contracts.
An oral contract valid by the laws of the state where made, may be
enforced in another state in which such contracts are required to be in
writing. Allen vs. Schuchardt, 13
11. Domicil, effee of, on Testamentary Ats.
1. In executing a will of personal property, the testator must observe
the formalities required by the law of his domicil, and not those of the
place where the Oill is made. The maxim "locus regit actum" has no
place in English or American testamentary jurisprudence. This princi-
ple is universally true when the domicil continues to the time of the
testator's death. Moultrie et al. vs. Hunt, . . . 148
INDEX.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
2. If the testator, after executing the will, changes his domicil and
resides under another jurisdiction at his death, the formalities required
by the new domicil must have been observed, or the will is void. ld.
3. A will is an inchoate and provisional transaction until the testator's
death, and the law may require, after its execution, new formalities to
be complied with. These, as well as other formalities, must have been
observed by all testators domiciled in the jurisdiction at the time of their
death, without reference to their domicil when the will was executed. Id.
4. In order that the principles of "comity" may be invoked in favor of
the wills of testators domiciled elsewhere, they must have resided in
another State at the time of their death. The will is then" enforced in
accordance with the rules of international law applicable to the subject.
Id.
6. An act done in another State, in order to crate rights which our
Courts ought to enforce on the ground of comity, must be of such a cha-
racter, that if done in this State in conformity with its laws, it could not
be constitutionally impaired by subsequent legislation. Per D£Nuo, J.
Id.
6. H., the alleged testator, made his will of personal estate in South
Carolina, where he then resided. He did not, when it was executed,
declare to the subscribing witnesses that it was his last will and testa-
ment. This declaration was not necessary by the law of that State, and
it was conceded that the will was at the time properly executed for South
Carolina purposes. After making his will he removed to New York,
where he resided at the time of his death. In this State such a declara-
tion is necessary. He died without republishing his wiU. Held, that the
will was void, and that H. died intestate. Id.
7. The law of the continent of Europe is not to be resorted to in deter-
mining a question of this kind, until the sources of instruction, furnished
by the Courts and jurists of England and of this country, have been ex-
hausted. Id.
III. Domicil, how far it governs Succession.
1. The inheritance, whether testamentary or from intestacy of a for-
eigner, and especially of an American of the United States, not domiciled
in France, must be regulated as to personal property existing in France,
without excepting the loans of the State by the law of the country where
the foreigner's domicil was, and where, consequently, his inheritance
was unobstructed. Succession of Gouri?, . . . . . 424
2. This rule, founded upon the maxim mobilia seguunturpersonam, has
no exception, except where Frenchmen interested as heirs in the in-
heritance of a foreigner, have. to defend themselves as to property exist-
ing in France against dispositions or statutes contrary to some one of the
essential and fundamental rights rendered sacred by French legislation,
such as the legal reservation, the prohibition of substitutions, &c.; in
which case the right of deduction created by Article 2, of the law of July
14th, 1819, is open to them. Id.
3. ESPECIALLY: The widow of a citizen of the state of Pennsylvania,
married agreeably to the law of that State, which is also that of the
inheritance, and endowed by virtue of its matrimonial law, with one-half
of all the personal property of her husband, has a right to demand in
France in opposition to a French universal legatee, the transfer, by vir-
tue of this title, of the one-half of a rente inscribed upon the great book
of the public debt. (Treaty of Reciprocity between France and the United
States of September 15th, 1853.) Id.
IV. Validity of blank transfer of Stock, governed by Law of Sate where to take effect.
See CORPORATION, 11. 7.
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I. Laws legitimating Bastards.
1. An estate already descended cannot be divested from the legal heirs,
and given to the bastard child of an intestate, by a subsequent statute of
legitimation; but the legislature may cure the taint of a bastard's blood
for the purpose of future inheritance. Killara vs. Millam, .18
2. By an act of the Legislature, passed in 1853, it was provided that
George V. K., son, and Emily M., daughter of George K., shall have and
enjoy all the rights and privileges, benefits and advantages, of children
born in lawful wedlock, and shall be able to inherit and transmit any
estate whatsoever, as fully and completely, to all intents and purposes, as
if they had been born in lawful wedlock." The persons named were, in
point of fact, children of George K., by the same mother, who, after their
birth, but before the passage of the act, had been married to a third per-
son, X. At the date of the act all parties were living. George W. died
in 1859, unmarried, and without issue, seised of land which had been
conveyed to him by his father. In an ejectment by the father against a
grantee of X. and his wife: Held, that the effect of the act of 1853, was
to remove, for all purposes of inheritance, the defect of blood of the child-
ren, as though at the time of their birth their parents had been lawfully
married; that the land passed, under the intestate laws of this State, to
his natural parents for their joint lives, notwithstanding that the mother
was then still the wife of X., remainder to his natural sister, tiily DI.,
in fee; and therefore that the father was entitled to recover, but only as
to an equal moiety of the land. Id.
3. Held, also, that the case was not affected by the general law of 1855,
which provides that the estate of a bastard, dying unmarried and without
issue, shall pass to his mother absolutely. Id.
4. Held, further, that the fact that the conveyance of the land in ques-
tion to George W. K., by his father, was expressed to be in consideration
of natural love and affection, was not material. Id.
II. Legal tender Notes.
1. Defendants executed a bond with warrant of attorney, for $28,000,
payable "in specie, current gold and silver money of the United States,"
and "that no existing law or laws, and no law or laws which may be
hereafter enacted, shall operate, or be construed as operating to allow
payment to be made in any other money, than that above designated ;"
"the said obligors expressly waiving the benefit derived or to be derived
from such law or laws."
Judgment was entered and fi. fa. issued, in which the sheriff was re-
quired to levy the debt and interest "in specie, current gold and silver
money." The Court, on motion, set aside the fi. fa., and held: That the
fi. fa. was irregular; as a final judgment is necessarily for lawful money,
and is payable in any money which the law has made a legal tender.
Shoenberger vs. Watts, .. . . . 553
2. By the charter of the Bank of the State of Indiana, it was provided,
that the bank should not at any time suspend or refuse payment in gold
or silver, of any of its notes, bills, or obligations, &c., and that if it
should neglect or refuse to do so, then the holder should be entitled to
recover the amount with twelve per cent, interest. On the 1st of April
1862, the plaintiff demanded of a branch bank payment of its notes in
coin, which was refused, but the amount tendered in United States legal
tender Treasury Notes.
Beld, (18t,) That the provision in the charter in question, did not
amount to a restriction of the right of the bank to avail itself of the
privilege of using anything else as money, as a tender, whichthe United
States, by their laws, might legally declare to be such.
(2d), That Congress had not the Constitutional power to declare pa-
per money a legal tender; but
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(3d), That, considering that the Legislature and Executive Depart-
ments of the Federal Government had decided in favor of the existence
of such a power, and what the consequences of an opposite decision at
the present time by the court would be, they would hold the Treasury
Notes to be a legal tender until the Federal Courts should determine
otherwise. .eynold3 vs. Ban& of the State of Indiana, . 669
III. Liability of U. S. loans to State taxation.
1. Stock in the public debt of the United States, whether owned by
individuals or by corporations, is taxable under the laws of the State.
The People vs. The Commissioners of Taxes, . . . . 81
2. The taxation, by the State, of-property invested in a loan to the
Federal Government, is not forbidden by the Constitutioir of the United
States, where no unfriendly discrimination to the United States, as bor-
rowers, is applied by the State law, and property in its stock is subjected
to no greater burdens than property in general. Id.
3. Whether Congress, for the purpose of giving effect to its powers to
borrow money, and of aiding the public credit, may constitutionally
enact that a stock to be issued by the Federal Government shall be ex-
empt from taxation, qutere. Id.
4. The cases of Afc~ullough vs. MAaryfiand, 4 Wheat. 116; Osborn vs.
UT. S. Ban . 9 Wheat. 738; and Weston vs. The City of Charleston, 2 Pet.,
examined and distinguished. Id.
IV. Stay Law, validity of.
The Indiana statute of 1861, which provides that in all cases of sales
by the Sheriff on execution, after its passage, the Sheriff shall not give
the purchaser a deed for, and possession of the property sold, but only a
certificate entitling him to a deed and possession in one year from the
sale, if the property is not redeemed in the manner therein provided, is
unconstitutional, so far as it applies to sales on judgments upon contracts
existing at, and before its passage. Scoby vs. Gibson, . 221
CONTEMPT.
In refusing to testify.
See WxTNEss.
CONTRACT.
I. When varied by subsequent Parol Agreement, or by Custom.
1. Where a contract is made by -written correspondence solely, it must
be treated as a contract in writing, not subject to addition or alteration
by proof of the acts, declarations, and intentions of the parties aliunde.
Whitmore vs. South Boston Iron Company, . . . . 403
2. But it is competent to show that the parties subsequent to entering
into the same, consented to waive any of its provisions, and to substitute
cthers in their stead. Id.
3. But an additional warranty, not expressed, or implied by its terms,
that the article sold is fit for a particular use, cannot be added, either by
implication of law or parol proof. Id.
4. Nor can the question whether such warranty is fairly to be inferred
from the application of the terms of the written contract to its subject-
matter, or from the attending circumstances, be submitted to the jury;
they should be instructed that no such warranty exists in the case. Id.
5. A contract to manufacture "retorts like the one before furnished"
imports more than likeness in "size, shape, and exterior form." It has
reference to the material and workmanship. Id.
6. Such a contract cannot be controlled by proving a custom in the
vicinity of the transaction, that founders shall not be hold to warrant
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their manufacture, unless by express contract; or, in case of apparent
defects, and the absence of any express agreement, that they shall have
their castings returned in a reasonable time, and the right to replace
them by new ones- Id.
7. The rule of damages for not furnishing manufactured articles ac-
cording to contract, is the difference in value between those actually
furnished and such as should have been, unless they were to have been
furnished for a particular use. Id.
II. When void as againa Public Policy.
See Ixsu&xoz, IL
CORPORATION.
I. Stock, how to be transferred.
1. Upon a pledge of stock in a railroad corporation in New Hamp-
shire, there should be such delivery as the nature of the thing is capable
of, and to be good against a subsequent attaching creditor, the pledgee
must be clothed with all the usual muniments and indicia of ownership.
Pinkerton vs. Hanchester and Lawrence Railroad, . . 96
2. Under the laws of New Hampshire, a record of the ownership of
shares must be kept by such corporations in this State, and by proper
certifying officers resident therein. Id.
3. On the transfer of stock the delivery will not be complete, until an
entry of such transfer is made upon the stock record, or it be sent to the
office for that purpose, and the omission thus to perfect the delivery will
be prima facie, and if unexplained, conclusive evidence of a secret trust,
and therefore as matter of law fraudulent 9nd void as to creditors. Where
the transfer was made at a distance from the office, and the old certifi-
cates surrendered, and new ones given by a transfer agent appointed for
that purpose, and residing in a neighboring State, proof that the proper
evidence of such transfer was sent to the keeper of the stock record to be
entered by the earliest mail communication, although not received until
an attachment had intervened, would be a sufficient explanation of the
want of delivery, and such transfer would be good against the creditor.
Id.
4. But where the pledge was made in Boston on the eighth day of July
by a delivery over of the certificates, and nothing more done until the
third day of the following August, and then the old certificates surren-
Idered to the transfer agent there, and new ones received from him, and
notice given by the first mail to the office at Manchester in this State: It
was held, that as against an attachment made between the obtaining the
new certificates and the notice at the office, the possession was not sea-
sonably taken, and the'transfer was therefore not valid. Id.
5. Where, upon a sale on execution of shares in a corporation, a certi-
ficate is demanded of the corporation by the purchaser, and a suit is
brought for refusing to give such certificate, the measure of damages is
the value of the stock at the time of the demand, with interest, and not
the value at the time of trial or at any intermediate period. Id.
II. Fraudulent isue of Stock.
R. & G. L. Schuyler being the owners of one hundred and sixty shares
in the defendants' company, of which R. Schuyler was the Register and
Transfer Agent, the latter in 1849 delivered to the plaintiffs, as collateral
security for a debt due by him, certificates for ninety of those shares, with
a blank power. No application for a transfer on the books of the com-
pany, as required by the charter, was made until 1854, when it was dis-
covered that R. S. had been guilty of a fraudulent over issue of the stock
of the company to his firm, but there was no evidence that -ny of this
spurious stock had passed out of the hands of the firm before the deli-
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very of the genuine certificates to the plaintiffs. The company subse-
quently refused to allow the transfer of the latter. Held,
1. Burden of proof.-It is incumbent upon the defendants to show, if
such be the fact, that these certificates do not represent the genuine stock
of the company, that being a fact more exclusively in their power to
prove.
2. Plaintiffs' title.-The plaintiffs are to be regarded as the first and
only equitable purchasers and owners of ninety of the one hundred and
sixty shares of genuine stock held by Schuyler.
3. Plaintiffs' title not lost by delay.-The bona fide holders of such cer-
tificates had a right to rely upon them, as securing to the owners the
shares which they represented, against all transfer to other parties.
4. A'otice to the Company.-The knowledge of Schuyler that these certi-
ficates were held by bona fide purchasers, for value, was notice to the
Company, while he acte( as their transfer agent in registering the trans-
fers to subsequent parties, and thus affected them, constructively, with
the fraud of their agent, and thereby avoided the effect of such transfers
as between the plaintiffs and the Company, and rendered them liable to
make good the plaintiffs' loss thereby sustained.
6. Semble.-It is by no means certain that the transfers registered are
to be regarded as having operated upon the plaintiffs' shares.
6. Blank transfers.-Blank powers of attorney, for transferring stock,
although under seal, may be filled up at the convenience of the trans-
ferree, and thus operate as of their date.
7. Lex loci.-Such being the settled law of the State of New York
where this instrument was intended to take effect, will remove all ques-
tion as to its validity, even if we admit that the law of the place where it
was executed is otherwise. Bridgeport Bank vs. The New York and New
Haven Railroad, 210
III. Assignment of Railroad to Creditor, when passes License to use a Patent.
See PATENT.
IV. Subscriptions by Towns, !o., to Stock.
See MUNICIPAL SUsSCRIPTIsO.
COSTS.
Attorney's Lien for.
See ATTORNEY.
CUSTOM.
Where admissible to vary Contract.
See CONTRACT, L
DAMAGES.
See CONTRACT, IL 7.
SLANDER.
Tnovxa.
DECEIT.
On sale of Articles of Food
See SALE OF GOODS, IL
DEED.
Blank Transfer or Power of Attorney.
See COnrORATION, II. 6.
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DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.
The Intestate law of Pennsylvania of 1833 provides that on the death
of a person without issue, his parents shall take his real estate during
their joint lives and the life of the survivor of them. A private statute
of that state passed in 1853 enacted that A. and B. children of C. should
have all the privileges, &c., of children born in lawful wedlock, and
inherit and transmit real estate as such. These were the offspring of C.
and of X., who had afterwards married Y. A. died intestate without
issue, in 1859, at which time C., X., and Y. were all living. Held, that
C. and X., as the legislative parents of A., took a joint life estate in his
lands. Killam vs. Killam, ... . 18
Held, also, that the act of 1855, which provides that the estate of a
bastard shall, on his intestacy without issue, pass to his mother abso-
lutely, did not apply. Id.
DOMICIL.
See CONFLICT or LAws, II., II.
DOWER.
I. Right of Tenant to disprove Sei in in Husband.
1. A tenant in an action of dower is not estopped from showing that
the seisin of the husband was not such as to give his wife a right of
dower, where he or his grantor has accepted a deed of the premises from
the husband and claims under it, although he may be estopped from de-
nying the right of the husband to give the deed. Foster vs. Dwinel, . 604
2. Estoppels are mutual. The wife is not estopped if the husband, in
a deed, misstates his title-as one not giving dower. Id.
3. Dower is no part of the estate of the husband, but an independent
and inchoate right, which may become an interest in the estate after his
death, if his seisin was such as to give it. But the law will not create
this estate by the operation of an estoppel where it otherwise would not
exist, where the tenant has simply accepted a deed from the husband,
which does not allude to the matter of dower, or to the existence of the
wife. Id.
4. Where it appears in. the deed from the husband, that his title is
only that of mortgagee before foreclosure, no estoppel can arise. Id.
II. Wife of Mortgagee when dowable.
The wife of a mortgagee cannot claim dower in an estate until the same
is foreclosed by the husband. Foster vs. Dwindl, . . 604
EASEMENT.
See WAY.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Diseretion at rial of Case.
1. As a general rule, the party holding the affirmative of the issues
has the right to open and conclude the argument to the jury; but such
practice being within the discretion of the court, the refusal to give the
defendant the conclusion will be no cause for reversal of the judgment.
Reichard vs. The Manhattan Life Insurance Company, . . 547
2. No exception lies to the decision of a judge of the superior court
upon the question whether a deposition which has been read in evidence
in a trial shall be delivered to the jury when they retire to consider of
their verdict. Whithead vs. Keyes, . 471
EQUITY.
I. Turisdiction over separate Estate of Married Woman.
See MARaIED WOIAN'S Aes.
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II. Specific Performance of Building Covenants and Restrictions.
See INJUNCTION.
ESCAPE.
Action for.
See ARREST, L
SHERIFF,
ESTOPPEL.
See DowER, I. 1, 2.
EVIDENCE.
I. Examination of Witnesses.
When the plaintiff in the course of a trial calls out the declarations of
the defendant, it does not follow, that all that was said by defendant
can be given in evidence, but only that which tended to qualify that given
in evidence by the plaintiff, and no more. Brouner vs. Goldsmith et at., 47
II. Foreign Judgment, where not inguirable into.
See PLEADING.
III. Written Contract, when varied by .Parol Evidence.
See CONTRACT, I.
EXECUTION.
On Stock, when preferred to Unregistered .Pledge.
See- CORPORATION, I. 5.
FOREIGN INSURANCE COMPANY.
See IxsuAxCE, I.
FRAUD.
Antecedent Debt, where constitutes a Purchaser for Value.
If the owners of property have intrusted it to an agent for a special
purpose, and the agent, in violation of his duty, has unlawfully consigned
the same to be sold, with directions to remit the proceeds to a private
creditor of-his own, and such creditor, upon being informed by a letter
from the consignee of the consignment of the property and directions in
reference to the same, manifests his assent thereto by unequivocal acts,
and.the property is sold by the consignee, and bills of exchange, payable
to the agent's creditor or his order, are purchased with the proceeds, and
remitted in a letter addressed to him, in compliance with the directions,
and the creditor, after receiving notice of the intended remittance, and
after manifesting his assent thereto, and after the remittance is actually
made, but before it is received, learns for the first time of the manner in
which the agent became possessed of the property, and of his wrongful
acts in reference to it, the original owners of the property cannot main-
tain an action for money had and received against such creditor, to re-
cover the amount collected by him upon the bills of exchange. Le Breton
vs. Peirce, . 35
HABEAS CORPUS.
Commiltment for Conterpt, when examinable upon.
See WITNESS.
INDEX.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See DOWER.
MARRtIED WomLNs's ACT.
INJUNCTION.
Against Violation of a Building Restriction.
H., being the owner of two city lots, one a corner property, and the
other adjoining it, granted and conveyed the corner lot to D. and 1. in
fee; reserving a perpetual ground-rent, upon the express condition that
the grantees, their heirs and assigns, should not erect any building upon
the back part of the lot higher than ten feet. H., at the time, and for
some years afterwards, occupied the adjoining property as his residence.
By five several mesne conveyances, all made subject to the condition, the
corner property became vested in M. in fee; H. having some years prior
to the conveyance to M. granted to the then owner permission to raise
his back building to the height of eleven feet, expressly stipulating that
such permission should not prejudice or impair the condition. H. died
seised of the adjoining property, and also of the rent reserved out of the
corner lot. His testamentary trustee granted and conveyed the adjoin-
ing property to C., no mention being made in the deed of the restriction
imposed on the corner property. M. subsequently, by sundry mesne
conveyances, became the owner of the rent reserved, which thus merged;
and M. threatened to build in entire disregard of the restriction. C. filed
a bill in equity to restrain him, and applied for a special injunction, which
was refused; and M. went on and erected a three story back building.
Held, upon appeal from the decree of the court below, refusing the
injunction and dismissing the bill:
1. That although the clause imposing the restriction was a strict con-
dition in law, yet equity would only inquire into the substantial elements
of the agreement, and would enforce it for any party, for whose benefit
it appeared to be intended.
2. That the duty of the defendant not to build in violation of the con-
dition was clear; and that this duty was not reserved as a mere personal
obligation to H., the original grantor, his heirs and assigns; nor for the
benefit. of the ground-rent; but that it was for the benefit of the adjoin-
ing property then owned by H.; and created an obligation to the owner
of that property, whoever he might be; and equity would interfere to
enforce and protect his right.
3. That a general plan of lots need not be shown; such a plan is only
one means of proof of the existence of the right and duty; and this may
appear as well from a plan of two lots, as of any greater number.
4. That the release of a part of a condition operates as a release of
the whole, only where forfeiture of the estate for a breach of the condi-
tion is demanded; equity will enforce the condition in its modified form
in favor of a party who asks only compliance with the agreement.
5. That the defendant having built in violation of the condition, after
bill filed, the complainant was entitled to a decree of abatement without
amending his bill Clark vs. Martin, . . . 479
INSURANCE.
I Authority of Officers of Insurance Company to hind by Guaranty of another
omapgny.
1. Though by the Charter of an Insurance Company it is provided that
"every contract, bargain, and other agreement," in execution of the
powers of the company, "shall be in writing or print, under the corporate
seal, and signed by the President. or, in his absence or inability to serve,
by the Vice-President or other officer, &c., and duly attested by the Secre-
tary or other officer," &c., a parol agreement as to the terms on which
a policy shall be issued, made by the President, Secretary, or other
INDEX. 781.
INSURANCE.
general agent of the company, may, nevertheless, be enforced specifically
in a court of equity, which, in case of a previous loss, will be by a decree
for the amount which would be due upon a policy duly executed: GRixa,
J. Constant vs. The Allegheny Insurance Company, . . 116
2. But a mere collateral agreement, which does not involve the exe-
cution of a policy of insurance, is not within the scope of'the general
authority of an officer or agent of such a corporation, and cannot be
enforced. Id.
3. The plaintiff, through a broker, applied to the defendants for an
insurance on a boat for a definite amount, and was informed that "it
would be taken." The defendants subsequently sent to the -broker their
own policy for a part, and the policies of'three other companies for the
residue, executed by an agent for the latter companies. The broker, on
receiving the policies, wrote, in the absence of his principals, to the
defendants, to say that he doubted whether the agency policies would be
accepted, alleging as a reason, that the particular agent had not. a good
reputation for "settling losses," and added, "I don't know whether it is your
custom to guarantee the offices you insure in, or not; if you do, I may pre-
vail on" the plaintiff "to hold the policies." The Secretary of the
defendants, in reply, wrote: "In handing the policies" to the plaintiff,
"you can say that if the boat is not inshred in offices satisfactory to him,
we will have them cancelled; but, though they are not re-insurances, yet in
case of loss we will feel ourselves bound for a satisfactory adjustnment. We
deem the companies good, and if any parties can settle with them, we can.
On the faith of this letter the plaintiff closed the transaction. One of
the substituted-companies afterwards became insolvent, and, a loss hav-
ing occurred, a special action on the case was brought against the defend-
ant: Held, (.) That the Secretary of the defendants had no general
authority to bind them by a guaranty of the solvency of the substituted
companies; and, (2,) if he had, his letter did not amount to this, but
only to an undertaking for a satisfactory determination of the amount
of the loss, and its apportionment between the insurers. Id.
II. Conditions in Policy restricting Right of Action, when void.
An agreement in a policy of insurance, executed by a foreign insurance
company, that the insured waives the right to bring an action upon the
policy except in the courts of the state incorporating such company, is
void, both as against public policy and the statute of this state relating
to foreign insurance companies of December 8, 1855; R. C., p. 884.
Rleichard vs. The Manhattan Life Insurance Company, . 547
III. Representations, on L#,fe Policy.
Where, in a policy of insurance upon life, the representation was made
that the insured was sober and temperate and in good health; if the
representation was true at the time it was made, the subsequent habits
of the insured would be no bar to a recovery upon the policy. Reichard
vs. The Manhattan .Life Insurance Company, . 547
IV. Abandonment of Voyage, on Marine .Policy.
1. An abandonment of the voyage insured and substitution of a new
voyage defeats the policy of insurance from the time of such abandon-
ment, although when the loss occurs the vessel is sailing in a track or
course of the voyage common both to the voyage described in the policy,
and in the substituted voyage. Merrill vs. .Boylston Fire and Marine
Insurance Company, . . . . . . . 342
2. Such abandonment may occur after the vessel has commenced her
specified voyage. Id.
3. The facts in the present case present a case of abandonment, and
not one of an intention to deviate, and the pblicy was therefore at once
defeated when the master of the ship abandoned the termini of the
INDEX.
INSURANCE.
voyage described in the policy, and sailed from Falmouth, bound to
Antwerp, as her port of discharge. Id.
V. Agreement for, when enforced in Eguity.
Ante, L 1.
INTESTATES.
L Succession to Estate, how affected by Domicil.
See CONFLICT OF LAws, III.
II. Laws of Pennsylvania.
See DEscEnT AN'D DISTRIBUTION.
JUSTICE OF PEACE.
Liability for Acts when not duly qualified.
1. A justice of the peace, in an action against himself for an arrest
under a warrant issued by him, cannot justify, if he had not, before such
arrest, taken the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution of the
State. Courser vs. Powers, . ... 268
2. Nor will a subsequent administration of the official oath, on the
same day of the arrest, enable him to do so, and the true time when such
oath was taken may be shown. Id.
3. Neither will the taking of the official oath under an election to the
same office for the previous year enable him to justify; the official oath
is only commensurate with the appointment, and covers only the existing
term of office. Id.
LAKE.
See RBAuwt OwxEas.
LEASE.
Re-entry for Yon-payment of Rent.
Our statutes with regard to the recovery of leased premises, except in
the specific remedy which they provide and the notice to quit prescribed,
do not dispense with the requirements of the common law on the subject.
Bowman vs. Foot, .. . . .. 352
A lease for a term of years, under which the rent was payable quar-
terly on certain days named, contained the following condition :-" Pro-
vided however, that if the lessee shall neglect to pay the rent as afore-
said, then this lease shall thereupon, by virtue of this express stipulation,
expire and terminate; and the lessor may, at any time thereafter, re-enter
said premises, and the same possess as of his former estate." Held,
1. That the terms expire and terminate were merely equivalent to the
more common expression,'shall becone void.
2. That the lease, by the non-payment of rent, did not become void,
but only voidable at the option of the lessor.
3. That to take advantage of his right to avoid the lease, it was neces-
sary for the lessor-ist. To make demand of the rent on the day it fell
due, on the premises, and at a convenient hour before sunset. 2d. Upon
neglect to pay the rent, to make a re-entry on the premises, or in some
other positive manner assert the forfeiture of the lease. [Per STORns, C.
J., and HINMAN, J.; ELLSWORTH and SANFORD, Js., dissenting.] Id.
Whether, after an entry for non-payment of rent, the acceptance of the
rent is a waiver of the forfeiture: Quere. The current of authorities is
against such a doctrine. Id.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES.
See CONSTITuTioNAL LAw, IL
